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Emily Grabham’s paper deftly positions the process of legislative drafting as an object of social-
scientific study. Her reconstruction of the use of gender pronouns anticipates so many lines of 
inquiry that it is difficult to hold to any one. In this brief comment I pick up on a theme that is 
suggested by Emily’s foregrounding of a statement issued by the Office of Parliamentary Counsel: 
‘the medium is not the message’. It is impossible not to have in mind the questions of temporality 
that Emily’s work encourages us to see. In the case of legislation, the medium consists not only in 
the materiality of text but in the cultural techniques of authorship and interpretation that are 
implicated in this materiality. And time is an essential ingredient of these medial techniques; the 
grammatical and syntactical machinery of legislation and legislative drafting not only animates the 
pronouns used in statutes, it also constitutes a locus of authorship that might itself be a subject of 
experimentation. 
From the perspective of gender, or a perspective that looks beyond gender, the 
grammatical routines of legislative drafting might be just as interesting as the pronouns that they 
choreograph. Legislative texts are articulated into a set of tenses – predominantly conditional – by 
means of which a normative programme or purpose is supposed to bind the future. As a legislative 
drafter might put it, a statute has to ‘provide’ for the future; to anticipate it (providere) by realising 
it into specified (contingent) events, and by specifying what will be the case if any these events 
should occur. The governing mood is the subjunctive: should a specified event occur, it will have 
been provided for. Indeed, the legislative drafter writes ‘as if’ specified events have already 
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occurred; the future is brought ‘back’ into the present by means of grammatical and syntactical 
protocols that materialise it textually in the locus of legislative authorship.  
First, conditional tenses function as (binary) switches which determine whether or when 
the time of a specified event will have come. Second, one effect of the syntactical-textual 
arrangement of statutes into clauses and subclauses is that, from the perspective of the drafter, 
‘provision’ for the future is made through the composition of a textual plane. There is time in this 
synchronous plane: the grammatical and experiential time that is involved in constructing (or, for 
the interpreter, reconstructing) a complex pattern of clauses and subclauses. This work of 
composition is explicitly notified in phrases such as ‘where by reason of subsections (3) to (5) of 
section 4 of this Act …’, but it is already implicit in the most fundamental premise of drafting and 
interpretation, which is that statutes should be addressed as coherent compositions. The spatiality 
of the text as a material body, and the time it takes to traverse that body, is the dimension within 
which conditional futures are fabricated and projected ‘forwards’.  
What does this have to do with the question of gendered or non-gendered pronouns? 
Speculatively, there is in the English context a deep historical connection between the grammatical 
or syntactical techniques of legislative drafting and the grammatical techniques of patrimonial 
property. The period from the sixteenth century onwards in which a profusion of charters, 
ordinances, proclamations and writs began to resolve itself into what we now recognise as the 
form of the statute (in large part through the agency of print) was also the period in which the 
early modern form of the patrimonial settlement was taking shape. Treatises and decisions in the 
early modern period quite explicitly made the analogy between these two contexts of textual 
drafting. Figuratively, both applications of drafting technique sought to convey or pass something 
into the future, by means of grammatical, syntactical, and textual switches that materialised future 
occasions or events into textual elements that could be grasped and arrayed in the present. The 
temporalities of suspension, reversion, and ‘for so long as’ that defined patrimonial estates and 






interests were ‘made of’ grammar. Property, as an economic, symbolic, and ethopoietic substance, 
was materialised and articulated grammatically, and worked its way into the social according to the 
capacities of technical grammar to channel time.  
Patrimonial settlements are a familiar part of the history of sex, gender, and power, 
precisely because the channelling of time was premised on sexual difference. With legislative 
drafting in mind, what is relevant here is the implication of gender in grammatical technique. The 
association can be illustrated by reference to the drafting techniques that were used to give married 
women what was then called ‘separate property’, a form that generates the drama in Wilkie Collins’ 
The Woman in White.1 A settlement might give a wife a power of appointment over ‘her’ property; 
that is, a right to select – ‘appoint’ – the beneficiaries. But the theory was that in exercising this 
power, the wife acted as the agent of the person who made the settlement; she was, as the lawyers 
put it, ‘a mere conduit pipe’. The writing by which she appointed beneficiaries was treated as if it 
had been a clause of the original settlement: ‘as if the limitation in that writing of appointment had 
been contained in [the] deed creating the power; for they take from the author of the power.’2 So 
the ‘real time’ agency of the woman was erased, or rather eclipsed, by the inert, already-completed, 
temporalities that were fabricated by drafting technique. The figure of eclipse is clearly expressed 
in the lawyers’ distinction between ‘substance’ and ‘shadow’, between ‘the passing of the estate 
which is the substance of the deed [and] the manner how which is the shadow...’3 
Here, substance and shadow were not people, they were primarily operations or 
documentary forms. And these operations brought into existence the gendered attributes that they 
operationalised. Neither ‘he’ nor ‘she’ referred to a substantial person; the qualities and 
competences of the ‘shadow’ were strictly those that had to be assumed for this particular 
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transaction, for this particular moment, in order for this grammatically-defined estate to ‘pass’ 
along a temporal channel that was already written into the settlement. In this mode of gender 
coding, ‘there is no consistent dichotomy, only a matrix of contrasts’, or ‘a prism that yields 
different patterns as it is turned’ (Strathern, 1980, p. 177).  The question of who or what turns the 
prism brings us back to the deep patriarchal logic of settlements, and also to the grammatical logic 
of legislation. Even if I am wrong in suggesting that the technique of legislative drafting originated 
with the technique of drafting settlements, even if the kinship is only analogical, the analogy 
illuminates one sense in which legislative drafting techniques ‘have helped usher in specific legal 
and textual formations with attached concepts and ontologies that have travelled far and combined 
with other long-lasting bureaucratic and wider social understandings of gender’ (Grabham, this 
issue).  
If grammar and syntax have the capacity to animate pronouns, and to generate and 
recombine the attributes that are associated with them, then experiments in ‘drafting otherwise’ 
might also involve working with alternative modes of grammatical animation, modes which 
traverse the binarism that is essential to conditional moods or tenses. It might also involve 
reimagining the locus of legislative authorship itself. Doctrinally, legislative authorship is supposed 
to be merely instrumental, to efface itself in the service of a political purpose. However intelligent 
or creative it is, drafting always plays juridical ‘shadow’ to political ‘substance’. And drafting works 
instrumentally because language works instrumentally. To say, as do the legislative drafters, that 
‘the medium is not the message’, is to understand technical drafting language according to ‘the 
theory of the postal system’ (Siegert, 1999).  The other side of that theory is the reality of a medial 
system that has already cued up the agencies of writers and readers.  
In the case of legislative drafting, the medial technology of grammar and syntax not only 
choreographs pronouns; it also interpellates the drafter into a particular authorial locus. The 
project of fabricating conditional futures locates the drafter themselves in the ‘time out of time’ 






that is generated by those conditional futures. Engagement with the grammatical machinery might 
allow one not only to reinvent the modes of existence associated with pronouns, but also to 
retemporalise this moment of authorship, to open it up to the possibilities of collaboration, 
displacement, or ‘desubstantialisation’ that would come from renouncing the position of 
ministerial mastery that drafters are still compelled to adopt. It might also allow one to take on the 
ancestrally patriarchal logic of drafting as the project of transmitting semantic capital into the 
future. Of course, legislation is also a political process, and judges are still the officially privileged 
interpreters of legislation, but with gender in mind experimentation with ‘legal form’ (to use 
Emily’s phrase) might be just the place to begin to unfold the political potential of legislation. To 
return to the theme of medium and message, the fact that legislative texts now exist as digital forms 
might open them up to the kind of transformative modes of authorship – distributed creativity – 
that are exemplified in practices such as fan fiction. In particular, and although it works as 
pornography or ‘postpornography’, the genre of slash fiction offers a sense of how writing 
practices in the digital era can perform or ‘entextualise’ gender otherwise (Willis, 2016). 
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